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Abstract 
In the last five years, electricity markets have undergone an important transformation.  The main reasons behind are the 
development of more competitive and profitable environments. Thus in many economies around the world it has gone from big 
monopolies to oligopolies, where competition laws of supply and demand govern their behavior.  On the other hand, the 
experience of the agents involved in these markets are increasing regarding their level of knowledge of the environment and the 
facility for accessing information. Consequently, more robust models for measuring risk are required, allowing them to 
implement the operation planning in the short and medium terms. Agents have defined objectives that in most cases are focused 
on profit maximization under internal or external constraints. In this type of scenarios with open markets and free competition, it 
is very complex to consider all the variables involved. Previous research has been pursued in order to manage the operation of the 
power systems, smart grids, blackouts, stability, and prediction. There are also developed models that aim of establishing the best 
strategy in the energy auctions, which optimizes the profitability of generators. However, they exclude income from traders 
whose main function is brokering with a different risk exposure. In order to tackle this issue, in this paper we present a complex 
model that targets to obtain the financial equilibrium between agents to ensure the compliance of transactions (purchases and 
sales of energy), considering key risk indicators. We implemented a proof-of-concept service platform based on the proposed 
model called Risker and its architecture and features are depicted. 
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1. Introduction 
Studies about electricity markets and their evolution have been directed towards two major currents. First, the 
tendency to estimate the market variables such as stock price, the price of contracts, demand level, supply level, 
generation capacity, among others; by using statistical tools either with mathematical models or simulations. 
Second, calculating exhibits in the functional systems, in order to establish with some certainty, the magnitude of the 
problems that happen within the operation. In the results found by Tushar1 the equilibrium between supply and 
demand through the use of game theory, where consumers play an important role in creating price, was a very 
important advance. However, to maximize the profitability of the consumer is an ambiguous result, because despite 
being located at the end of the cycle of energy, what users seek is the reduction in cost without generating returns 
through speculation or arbitrage, and commonly is not the purpose of the business, it means the consumers used the 
energy as a necessary good not like a profitable one2. 
 
For his part some authors3,4,5 performed decomposition of the variables involved in process of creating prices, 
including phenomena such as social affairs, climatic, economic indicators, regulatory requirements, using 
mathematical techniques, statistics or new technologies, such as artificial intelligence. That decomposition aims at a 
certain level of certainty, projecting price developments in the future. Quantify risk exposures related to the 
operation, and financial exposures linked to power generation have captured the focus of the different works 
developed so far2,3,6.  
 
This problem has been addressed considering the interactions between agents from a purely functional or 
operational perspective. For Boreinstein and Bushnel2,3 it is evident that each agent, trader, generator or consumer 
should be at an established relationship level with other participants, looking for maximizing the results amid the 
laws of supply and demand. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: First we present a review of related 
research, followed by the methodology used, then we present the details of a proof-of-concept implementation of a 
forecast and risk management platform called RiskeR and we finally present our conclusions and future work paths. 
2. Related work 
Energy markets are an oligopoly because participants often pursue strategies, and adapt those ones to changing 
market conditions6,7. Also performing replicating approaches that enable operation models in a complex frame given 
the large number of variables and situations to consider6,8. 
 
Game theory can represent strategic behavior, however, many of these models are very simplified and do not 
capture the complexity arising from the markets, but they bring partial signals of their behavior instead9. On the 
other hand, the agent-based simulation (ABS) overcomes some of the weaknesses of the model of market 
equilibrium centralized9 where the main objective is the fulfillment of the demand but do not ensure the financial 
viability of service providers. ABS models are increasingly used to analyze the decisions made by the generators, 
distributors, traders, regulators and consumers in a liberalized market10. 
 
The problem of energy market models has focused on the estimation of price developments, changes in demand, 
simulation of market strategies from producing agents, defining energy policies, technology selection, among 
others10. However, exploring the interrelationships of the agents with the operation of the electrical system in the 
short and medium terms from the point of view of its financial strength, it is something that should be explored. 
 
The most important aspect that this paper addresses is to propose solutions that try to cover gaps in conceptual 
modeling of electricity markets related to a corporate risk approach. Financial risk factors such as credit risk; 
counterparty, operational and market can affect the competitive position of the decisions of the agents. Thus it can 
impact its operation. 
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3. Modeling 
The core of our platform is based on a complex system modeling. The model takes into account the expected 
return of agents that depends on the volume of transactions and ability to generate capital returns associated with the 
purchase and sale of energy in the electricity market. In that way, profitability, risk position, capital availability, 
adequacy of investments in time frames, liquidity, solvency and the management of the debt, specifically "outside 
capital" (financial liabilities with cost), are variables that must be in permanent evaluation.  
 
The goal of the agents is to do transactions in the market in order to reach the best profitability as they can, under 
the uncertainty conditions, specifically financial conditions from others.  
 
The model equation is defined as (1) 
 
U(t,i) = (S(t,i) * p(t,i) −Q(t,i) * p(t,i) )+CCt,i + (He−Ee)* pbt −CGt,i −OyMt −Dt,i *Kdt,i
           
(1) 
 
The first part of the equation represents the quantity of energy through contracts, because there are differences 
between purchases (Q) and sold energy (S). The second part considers the quantity through stock market for reach 
the demand or obtain a profit using the surplus, and is possible discount the operative expenses. Finally, the last 
expression is the financial cost for the debt.  
 
In order to optimize the model, we use the simplex method in order to find a utility maximization through its 
linear behavior. The scenario simulation is performed for a month of operation programming, which requires the 
release of energy to final consumers through retailers, whose responsibility is the fulfillment of such dispatch of 
energy.  To summarize, the model will maximize the following expression (2) 
 
Max _U(t,i) = (S(t,i) * p(t,i) −Q(t,i) * p(t,i) )+CCt,i + (He−Ee)* pbt −CGt,i −OyMt −Dt,i *Kdt,i
           
(2) 
Profit and losses statement for trader and producer subject to,  
Ebiti,t/(Dt,i x Kdt,i)   2.5  Financial Capacity  
Di,t/Ebitt,i    4.0  Maximum Leverage  
VaR1t,i   10%*Et,i 
VaR2t,i   20%*Et,i  
SCOSt,i = [(Et,i - VaR1t,i)/((pzt  - pt,i)*2)]   Financial capacity of operations “Sell” 
SCOBt,i = [(Et,i - VaR2t,i)/((pt,i - pmint )*2)]  Financial capacity of operations “Buy”  
Dt,i/Et,i  80%  Financial leverage  
 
Where, 
pt,i = The price at time t for contracts, considered by the agent i. 
Qt,i = Quantity of energy purchased by agent i at time t, in contracts. 
St,i = Quantity of energy sold by agent i at time t using contracts 
Kdt,i = Interest rate, financial cost for agent i, at time t. 
OyMt,i = Operative and management expenses from agent i, at time t 
Dt,i = Total debt of agent i, at time t (outside capital). 
Het,i = Quantity of surplus energy by agent i at time t. 
Eet,i = Quantity of shortages energy by agents i at time t. 
pbt  = Price in stock exchange, spot price in the market. 
Ebitt,i = Operating income after discount expenses and cost by agent i at time t 
VaRt,i = Value at risk of financial operations form agent i, at time t 
Et,i = Equity value composed by subscribed capital, reserves, accumulated profit, valorizations, and others. 
SCOBt,i = Support capacity of operations, financial capacity for operations (buys) 
SCOSt,i = Support capacity of operations, financial capacity for operations (sales). 
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4. Implementation 
We implemented a web platform in order to wrap up the aforementioned core model. The main objective is to 
provide financial risk management as a service for regulator entities as well as for energy agents. We used a typical 
client-server implementation relying on virtual cloud servers. There are two architecture models, test and 
production. The first test platform uses one virtual server using Nginx12 as web server and in the same instance we 
use MySQL13 as database provider. The backend is supported by Laravel14, a PHP framework and front-end relies 
on html5, CCS3, JavaScript and Bootstrap15 for page-device adaptation. In Fig. 1 we depict the test implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 Test Architecture 
The production architecture consists into a web server (Nginx) with redundancy using an independent virtual server for each instance. There is 
one independent database server (MySQL), which is deployed with redundancy as well. An additional fileserver is used for data and 
configurations backup ( 
Fig. 2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Production Architecture 
 
      The platform is composed of a landing followed by a login authentication, which leads to the main dashboard 
space (Fig. 3) 
The main dashboard page provides three tabs. The first one provides the list of energy company agents. A short 
name is display with a full name display while hovering. The agent display has two modes compact and expanded. 
The compact model displays the short name and the total energy demand assigned to that agent. The extended model 
displays the total energy for buy and sell as well as the current prices (Fig. 4) 
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Fig. 4 Platform Dashboard 
The Agent Details section presents four tabs which display information about: Model forecast, buy and sell 
amounts, agent interactions with other agents, stock information and Key Risk Indicators (KRI) profile. The last 
panel displays a global overview of the whole system with corresponding KRIs. The metrics are colored regarding 
predefined thresholds. The thresholds are graded in four categories: red (critical), yellow (warning), blue 
(acceptable), green (good). 
 
The second main tab depicts each agent interaction with rest of the system. We provide an interactive graph with 
proportional arrows showing buy/sell relationships as well as total traded energy amounts (Fig. 5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5 Agents Interactions 
 
The last tab provides charts with information regarding the individual percentage of agent participation in the 
market, comparison of the model forecast optimization in relationship with the current data per agent, as well as 
additional KRI charts (Fig. 6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 6 Agent Participation and metrics charts 
5. Conclusions and Future work 
We presented a practical platform implementation based on a complex system model to provide risk management 
and market forecasts related to energy trading agents. We implemented a proof-of-concept service platform that 
provides financial risk indicators assessment as well as recommendations for market performance. We propose as 
futures work the addition of different optimization models in order to benchmark multiple approaches. The platform 
will evolve towards an automated system to generate triggers and alarms regarding pre-defined contexts. We 
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consider that automatic data collection and data reporting are key elements to develop and reinforce. Data mining 
and open data can be also linked to provide useful information in order to increase model robustness and diversity. 
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